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 The Effect of Legal Theories on Judicial Decisions, 
by Anthony D’Amato,* 74 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev., 517-527 (1999) 
 
Abstract: I draw a distinction in the beginning of this essay between judicial decision-making and a judge's deci-
sion-making. To persuade a judge, we should try to discover what her theories are. Across a range of theories, I of-
fered well-known case examples typically cited as examples of each theory. Then I showed that the exact same 
theory used to justify or explain those case results could be used to justify or explain the opposite result in each of 
those cases. 
 





  Stanley Fish has argued that theory does not constrain practice. Legal scholars by now 
are quite familiar with his argument. Yet they go on using theory in their teaching and writing. 
Indeed, legal theorizing seems to be healthier than ever. If you look at casebooks in torts, con-
tracts, or constitutional law that were published fifty years ago, and compare them with today's 
casebooks, you will discover that the old casebooks were filled almost entirely with cases. In 
contrast, today's casebooks (more properly called coursebooks) are on average half-filled with 
cases, the remaining pages containing articles, notes, speeches, comments, and other materials 
dealing with various mid-level theories and concepts. The trend seems to be that "materials" are 
on the upswing and "cases" on the downswing. Law school teaching is becoming awash in 
theory. 
 
 If Fish is right, are all legal theorists wasting their (and their students') time? In the 
present essay, I want to take the apparently paradoxical position that Fish is absolutely right, and 
yet legal theory is definitely not a waste of time. Students in law school learn how to best predict 
what judges will decide the law to be. If judges are guided by legal theories, then students of the 
law need to know what these theories are. Yet if the decisions judges make are not constrained 
by theory, then why should students learn the theories? In this essay, I try to answer that question 
by introducing a distinction that, as far as I know, has not previously been drawn in this context: 
between judicial decision-making and a judge's decision-making. That distinction will only make 
sense after we briefly review the basis for Fish's argument. 
 
I. THEORY DOES NOT CONSTRAIN PRACTICE 
  
  Fish's argument can be summarized as follows. We derive theory  [pg518]  from practice; 
therefore, theory cannot constrain (or govern) the practice from which it is derived:  
This, then, is why theory will never succeed: it cannot help but borrow its terms and its contents from that 
which it claims to transcend, the mutable world of practice, belief, assumptions, point of view, and so forth. 
And, by definition, something that cannot succeed cannot have consequences, cannot achieve the goals it 
has set for itself by being or claiming to be theory, the goals of guiding and/or reforming practice.  FN1 
  
 How does Fish's argument apply to legal theory? Ten years ago, I wrote an essay entitled 
Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?FN2 The idea behind the essay, which 
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 would have worked better as a classroom dialogue than a published article, was roughly this: 
name any legal theory that you say explains the result in any case (or series of cases), and I will 
show you how that same legal theory could just as satisfactorily explain the exact opposite result 
in that case (or series of cases).FN3 Since I did not have an interlocutor to pick theories (as I 
might in a classroom), I chose some theories that are widely accepted as explaining (constrain-
ing, governing) the results in some famous cases. To make the theories representative of legal 
theorizing in general, I chose theories that ranged from the very broad to the very narrow: 
  
 1. A very broad theory: Judge Posner's theory that judges in all cases should maximize 
wealth;  FN4 
 
 2. A narrower, subsidiary theory to the above: judges in all cases should minimize trans-
action costs;  FN5 
   
 3. A combination of theories: the three Brest-Levinson theories of the First Amend-
ment—judges in all cases should protect representative government, advance knowledge, 
and promote truth;  FN6 
  
  [pg519]  4. An interpretive theory: the assertion that "strict constructionist" judges will 
be "tough on crime"; FN7 
  
 5. A process theory: Dworkin's "chain novel" theory used to explain stare decisis;FN8 
   
6. A mathematical theory: Judge Hand's negligence formula used to explain tort cas-
es;FN9 and 
   
 7. A theory so narrow that it can be stated in a single word: the idea of "cost" to help ex-
plain the result in any given case.FN10 
  
 Across this range of theories, I offered well-known case examples typically cited as examples of 
each theory. Then I showed that the exact same theory just used to justify or explain those case 
results could be used to justify or explain the opposite result in each of those cases. Thus, if 
Theory X can be "applied" in a case to reach the result P wins and also to reach the result D 
wins, then Theory X can hardly be said to "apply" at all. I contend that this is true of every 
theory that has ever been said to apply in every case that has ever been decided. 
 
 Of course, simply describing what I (believe I) proved in another article is woefully in-
sufficient; I invite the reader to consult the original article. What is interesting here is that, ten 
years later, the arguments in that article have not (so far as I am aware) been challenged. My es-
say does not seem to have slowed down in the slightest the burgeoning amount of theorizing 
going on in law journals, casebooks, and classrooms. No one seems to have given up on theoriz-
ing as a result of what Stanley Fish or I wrote over a decade ago. And this, in a perverse sense, 
corroborates our anti-theory views. For if, as Fish says, theory has no effect on practice,FN11 
then his (and my) anti-theory—which is itself a theory, of course—also cannot be expected to 
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 have any discernible effect upon the academic practice of theorizing! Our anti-theory, if unac-
cepted, is by that very fact corroborated! What else could we expect? In Ira Gershwin's immortal 
words, who could ask for anything more? 
 
II. WHERE LEGAL THEORY SEEMED TO WORK 
  
  The most well-known and perspicuous case in the legal literature [pg520] that illustrates 
the force of legal theories in action is Lon Fuller's The Case of the Speluncean Explorers.FN12 
Fuller constructed his mythical case on a stipulated set of facts and a single applicable one-
sentence statute (with no legislative history), thus giving the five justices of the Newgarth Su-
preme Court no room to argue over the facts or legislative materials.FN13 Five Speluncean Ex-
plorers were trapped in a cave for thirty-two days; they survived only by killing and eating the 
flesh of one of their party.FN14 After their rescue, they were prosecuted under a statute that 
simply provided: "Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by death."  
FN15 Each justice applied his deepest theory of law to the question whether the four surviving 
Speluncean Explorers should be found guilty of murder.FN16 
 
 None of the justices' theories could be labeled "ivory-tower." Each justice took into ac-
count all the facts and circumstances of the four defendants. Each justice thought about the effect 
of his decision on society and its receptivity to the rule of law. Each justice considered whether 
the Chief Executive would pardon the defendants if they were convicted. In addition, each judge 
examined his own moral impulses. In short, each justice had a world-view, shaped through long 
experience in the deliberation and decision of cases, that constituted for him an overarching 
commitment to the proper role and function of courts in the legal system. 
 
 Chief Justice Truepenny's opinion was the most cut-and-dried: the defendants clearly vi-
olated the statute and thus there was nothing for the court to do but to find them guilty of murder.  
FN17 But he went on to urge the Chief Executive, in the strongest possible terms, to pardon 
[pg521]  the defendants.FN18 
 
 Justice Foster constructed two arguments on the basis of natural law. First, he argued that 
the explorers, trapped in a cave, were effectively removed from Newgarth's jurisdiction and 
hence were in a "state of nature." Newgarth's laws, therefore, could not apply to them.FN19 
Second, and in the alternative, he accepted the applicability of Newgarth's murder statute, but 
argued that its purpose—to deter crime—could apply neither in the case of self-defense (a tradi-
tional judge-created exception to the statute) nor to a case of necessity where the only result 
would be that all five explorers would have starved to death before they could have been res-
cued.FN20 Their decision to consume the flesh of one of their number meant that four lives out 
of five were saved, and it would be absurd now to sentence the survivors to death.FN21 
 
 Justice Tatting's opinion can be said to reflect the legal theory of deep uncertainty in the 
law. He noted strong objections to all the arguments that had been made, both those in favor of 
convicting the defendants and those that favored acquittal.FN22 Torn by this uncertainty, he 




 Justice Keen was a positivist in the grand Bentham-Austin tradition. He believed that a 
judge should simply apply the words that the legislature has enacted into law in the form of a sta-
tute.  FN24 The murder statute has no exceptions; therefore, the defendants have violated it. No 
judge should allow his personal feelings to enter into a case. Justice Keen said this in the strong-
est possible way: he began his opinion by saying that if the decision were his to make in a private 
capacity, he would not hesitate to free the defendants.FN25 But because he is empowered to 
make the decision in his public capacity as a judge, he has no choice but to find the defendants 
guilty.FN26 
 
 Justice Handy's theory was one of legal realism. He stated that public opinion polls 
showed that ninety percent of the public would vote to acquit the defendants.FN27 He also re-
vealed that he heard, [pg522]  through a friend of the Chief Executive's secretary, that if the court 
found the defendants guilty, the Chief Executive would not pardon them. FN28 Since, realistical-
ly speaking, the pardoning route was not available to the court, the decision that would best satis-
fy the public and not make the court look foolish was to vote to acquit.FN29 
 
 The final vote on the supreme court was 2-2 (with Justice Tatting having with-
drawn).FN30 The decision of the judge below was thus affirmed, and the Speluncean Explorers 
were sentenced to death.FN31 
 
 Fuller constructed his case so well that there are four complete theories that stand on their 
own merits—five if you include Tatting's indeterminacy as a theory. Despite the criticisms that 
each justice leveled at his brothers' theories, the opinions emerge as polished and complete. We 
can well imagine that if the Supreme Court of Newgarth had only one justice that was assigned 
to review this case, then the outcome of the case would have been completely determined by the 
deeply held theory of whomever of the five jurists—Truepenny, Foster, Tatting, Keen, or Handy 
—was sitting on the bench. But if there were more than two justices assigned to the case—
whether three, four, or five—then no theory could explain the result.FN32 The theories would be 
incompatible with each other. 
 
III. DWORKIN'S THEORY 
  
  The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is certainly what we might call a "hard case." Ro-
nald Dworkin has taken the position that the hard cases in principle have a unique solution if on-
ly the deciding judge—whom he names Judge Hercules—had infinite time, all the resources in 
the world, and infinite brain-power.FN33 One could respond to Dworkin that since there are no 
such judges, hard cases in the real world defy unique solutions. But this argument would miss 
Dworkin's point: that in principle a unique solution exists, and hence real judges should try to get 
as near to it as possible within the inevitable constraints of time and money. 
  
 Rather, what I find fascinating about Dworkin's argument is the [pg523] not-often noticed 
point that he employs a single judge to do his theoretical work. What if, instead, Dworkin had 
posited a panel of three super-judges—Hercules, Kirkules, and Smerkules? Suddenly he and his 
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 readers would have grave misgivings. For it is easy to imagine that these three judges would 
each expend infinite time and resources reading the same materials and yet come to divergent 
conclusions. Suppose the case involved a hard issue of interpreting a clause in the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Judge Hercules could find, after reading all the materials, that the Madisonian world-view 
was the most persuasive political theory informing the correct interpretation of this clause. Judge 
Kirkules could find on the contrary that the Hamiltonian world-view was the deepest and most 
persuasive theory. And Judge Smerkules could find that both the Madisonian and Hamiltonian 
views unfairly distorted the true intentions of the Framers, and hence the most persuasive theory 
informing the proper interpretation of the constitutional clause could only be one that was both 
anti-Madisonian and anti-Hamiltonian. 
 
 Deeply-held theories are hard to reconcile with one another (unless they turn out to be va-
riants on the same theory). One can test this by paying a visit to a good philosophy department. 
Arrange a meeting with the specialist on analytic philosophy and ask her whether she has many 
discussions with her colleague, the specialist on metaphysical philosophy. She probably will say, 
"Yes, our children are on the same little league team, so whenever we see each other we talk 
baseball." "No," you say, "I mean discussions on philosophy." She will probably answer, "Well, 
when I first came here years ago we started into such a discussion, but we were really talking 
past each other and it got a bit heated and we figured that talking about these things would only 
lead to bad collegial feelings." "Well," you ask, "what do you think of the things he's written?" 
"Frankly," she might reply, "he addresses very large issues, like the ontology of the universe. But 
I don't think he actually says anything at all. He's totally ivory-tower." Then you pay a visit to the 
metaphysician and get pretty much the same answers until the last question. He says, "Frankly, 
she addresses very small issues that nobody in the world cares about except other analytic philo-
sophers—such as the grammatical structure of simple sentences. She's totally ivory-tower." 
 
If we go all the way back to Plato and Aristotle, we find that they talked completely past each 
other. Plato's method was deductive: you start with ideal forms and reason downward to get to 
the real world. Aristotle's method was inductive: you begin with the real world and  [pg524]  rea-
son upward to get to theories. As Lon Fuller once resignedly told me about another twentieth-
century jurisprudential giant, H.L.A. Hart, "I guess we're fated never to understand each other." 
Or, in the immortal words of Gilbert & Sullivan: 
  
I often think it's comical (fal, lal, la!) 
How nature always does contrive (fa, lal, la!) 
That every boy and every gal 
 That's born into the world alive 
Is either a little Liberal 
 Or else a little Conservative.FN34 
  
 So far we are left (I hope, if I have been doing my job right) with an uneasy feeling. What 
good is theory unless it locks in a particular solution to a problem? Why should professors be 
teaching legal theory to their students? In the next and final part of this essay, I will try to spell 




IV. THE UTILITY OF THEORY 
  
  As Einstein and many others have said, our theories of the world determine the way we 
see the world. We cannot help but see the world through the lens of our theories. "Einstein held 
that there is no "real world' to which one can repair—the whole concept of the "real world' is jus-
tified only insofar as it refers to the mental connections that weave the multitude of sense im-
pressions into some connected net."FN35 Since the deepest theories we hold in our minds interp-
ret for us what we see, it follows that for each of us our theories "work." They "apply" to the real 
world. As Stanley Fish put it: "Theories always work and they will always produce exactly the 
results they predict, results that will be immediately compelling to those for whom the theory's 
assumptions and enabling principles are self-evident. Indeed, the trick would be to find a theory 
that didn't work."FN36 
 
 But the important point is that although my theory works for me, it does not necessarily 
work for you. My theories may appear to constrain my decisions (whom I vote for, what I read, 
what I write) but they certainly do not appear to constrain yours. They do not even seem to make 
the slightest impression on my two sons, despite the [pg525] many years I put into bringing them 
up to understand, absorb, and share my well-formulated theories of the world. 
 
 When we look at the decisions of judges, we can say that each judge always follows her 
own theories. But we cannot say that any judge always follows another judge's theories. Even if 
some judges are strongly influenced by other judges—as Justice Thomas seems to be influenced 
by Justice Scalia—no judge can see the world exactly the way another judge sees it. Judge A 
cannot see as deeply into Judge B's theory as Judge B sees it. For example, Judge B may believe 
that legislative intent has nothing to do with the interpretation of statutes. Judge A might be con-
vinced by all the reasons that Judge B has given in his opinions that legislative intent is irrelevant 
to statutory construction. But then some day Judge B could surprise everyone by saying that 
when a clause in the Constitution has to be construed, the intent of the Framers is indeed rele-
vant. Judge B might not be able to draw a distinction that would convince his brethren on the 
bench. Yet in his own mind, Judge B might "see" a world of difference between a constitution 
and a statute—a difference so great that no theory of interpretation could work for both. He 
might not be able to articulate this difference in a principled way, except to say that you cannot 
compare apples and oranges.FN37 After all, it is his theory of statutory and constitutional con-
struction, his way of looking at the legal world, and if others do not see it or understand it, so 
much the worse for them. 
 
 More generally, if I say that M is being inconsistent, M can reply, "You can't understand 
the deep consistency that lies beneath the surface inconsistency." M's theories always make 
sense—to M. They make sense and they work. 
 
 So why do professors teach theories to law students? We might be misled if we ask the 
students or the professors. A student might say, "I'm learning this theory because I have to give it 
back on the final exam." Another student might say, "This theory explains the result in a line of 
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 cases—or at least the professor thinks so, and I better be thinking the way the professor thinks if 
I want to do well on the final." Another student might say, "This theory explains the cases in this 
chapter. It explains them for me." A professor might reply, "I've studied these cases intensely, 
and I only give my students the  [pg526]  best explanatory theory that I am capable of giving. I 
really believe that these theories not only explain the case outcomes in the book, but they are the 
best predictors we have of future judicial decision-making." 
 
 I do not know if these are the answers you will actually get if you make inquiries, but if 
they are, I want to disagree with them. No theory can explain the result in any case (as I argued 
in Part I of this essay), just as no theory explained the result in The Case of the Speluncean Ex-
plorers (as I argued in Part II). 
 
 But the judges in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers—and the judges in every case 
that has ever been decided in any courtroom in the world—believe that their own theories ex-
plain the decisions they reach. They also believe that their own theories are sound. They believe 
that if other judges disagree with their decisions, those other judges are just plain wrong. 
 
 In other words, the judge is like the professor (in the third paragraph above). Each judge 
believes that her own theory explains the results in previous cases, stands as the best predictor of 
future case results, and thoroughly accounts for the decision she has reached in the instant case. 
The professor believes the same of the theories he teaches to his students. 
 
 Thus, we are back to the distinction I drew in the beginning of this essay: between judi-
cial decision-making and a judge's decision-making. This turns out to be a distinction between 
the external point of view and the internal point of view. When we look at judicial decision-
making, we are looking externally at a pattern of decisions over time. We try to fashion a theory 
that "explains" this pattern, but as Stanley Fish said in the first quotation in this essay, the pattern 
gives rise to the theory and not the other way around. If the pattern changes, we simply "refine" 
our theories. If someone claims that our previous theory failed to explain the change in pattern, 
we respond that a more sophisticated account of our previous theory—which was inherent in the 
theory itself—would have succeeded in explaining the change. Of course, what we have really 
done is modify the theory in light of the change in the practical world. 
 
 The external point of view, then, does not work and cannot work. Yet, it is the one we 
study. Why? 
 
 Simply because the external point of view helps us, in surrogate fashion, to get partially 
inside the heads of the judges who will be deciding the cases we will argue someday. Fortunate-
ly, all the judges  [pg527]  in the United States once went through law school and learned theo-
ries of law similar to the ones that are being taught today. Accordingly, we have a fairly good 
idea of what the judges may be theorizing simply by studying theories like the ones they studied. 
 
 For, ultimately, the essence of the lawyer's craft is not to learn theories but to persuade 
judges. To persuade a judge, we should try to discover what her theories are. In legal practice, 
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 we do this by reading her previous opinions. We try to "locate" her theories within the theories of 
law we learned while in law school. These theories we learned in school, therefore, have a heu-
ristic value. If a judge's previous opinions reveal her to be a positivist, then we have an idea—
from the theories of positivism we have learned—how to bring our client's side of the case with-
in her theories. We will take a "positivistic" approach if we want to persuade her, because we 
have some confidence that that is the approach she will take in deciding the case. 
 
 If another judge in another case demonstrates a "natural law" view of the world, or a "le-
gal realist" view, or a "pragmatic" view, or a "formalistic" view, again, we will be at our persua-
sive best if we can show how a proper interpretation of the facts of our client's case fits within 
these overarching theories.FN38 
 
 My most important point is that we do these things not because we believe that any 
theory of the law explains the law, but rather because we understand that judges (from their in-
ternal point of view) believe that their own theories explain the law. To be persuasive in our ad-
vocacy, we must first identify the theory that the judge in our case believes in (to the extent we 
can from prior opinions) and then portray the facts of our case within that theory. We do not 
have to believe that the theory will work at all times and all places; no theory can "work" in that 
sense. All we have to believe is that the judge believes that the theory will work in the instant 
case. In order to be effective advocates, we need to persuade the judge by working within her 
theory rather than confronting her with a different theory that we may happen to think is "better" 
in some sense. The practice of law is not about advocating the best explanatory theories (there is 
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